The Third Circuit Court of Appeals excoriated the territory’s courts for “enduring judicial inertia” in a ruling Monday over an inmate’s petition that has languished for 10 years. The opinion comes just days after the V.I. Supreme Court struck down a Virgin Islands statute mandating speedy trials for elderly litigants, saying it is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
The Third Circuit case concerns Jamal Morton. Convicted of second-degree murder and firearms offenses in 2012 in V.I. Superior Court and sentenced to 50 years, he has waited 10 years for the court to respond to the merits of his habeas petition — essentially a review of the validity of his convictions.
The V.I. Supreme Court case concerns Vincent Liger of St. Croix who is suing Limetree Bay Terminals for alleged contamination of his property from a refinery flaring incident that spewed pollutants into the atmosphere. He filed suit in August 2022 and in June 2023 Superior Court Judge Jomo Meade granted his motion for trial preference for those over age 70 under the statute passed by the V.I. Legislature and signed into law by Gov. Albert Bryan Jr. in the summer of 2021.
Limetree Bay appealed the decision, arguing that the statute violates the separation of powers principles of the Revised Organic Act of 1954 — the territory’s de facto constitution — and the Equal Protection Clause in the Virgin Islands Bill of Rights. The V.I. Justice Department supported the appeal in an amicus curiae brief. The case was argued on May 14 before Chief Justice Rhys S. Hodge and Associate Justices Ive Arlington Swan and Harold W.L. Willocks.
Specifically, Limetree argued that the statutory mandate that a trial must occur within 180 days infringed on the authority of the individual judges of the Superior Court to manage their docket and that of the judicial branch to establish the rules of practice and procedure to govern proceedings. It also claimed the preference statute violates equal protection guarantees by automatically providing this right to every litigant who is over 70, without regard to any factor besides age.
On Friday, the court found for Limetree in an opinion penned by Hodge that among other issues dissected the difference between a procedural rule versus a substantive right, finding that the statute is procedural, and thus out of the realm of the legislative branch.
The extensive legislative history cited by the parties in the case “reflects that the Legislature did not intend to enact the mandatory preference statute to create a substantive right, but to control the internal affairs of the Judicial Branch. Senator Kurt A. Vialet stated that ‘cases are not flowing through the system the way that they should’ and that ‘it is our job to pass [the Act] and send a message that this body is not pleased with what is presently taking place,’” Hodge wrote.
One of the bill’s co-sponsors, then Sen. Janelle K. Sarauw, “emphasized the large backlog of cases in the Superior Court as a reason to enact the legislation. Senator Milton E. Potter even openly acknowledged the procedural nature of the statute, stating that ‘the judiciary has the ultimate say as to how it chooses to manage its docket, but if nothing else, this bill will send a message that the Legislative branch is concerned [that] the docket is not moving as swiftly as it should,’” the opinion states.
Court rules are replete with provisions that provide certain protections for specific groups, such as the children or the disabled, and yet are nevertheless clearly procedural, said Hodge — they simply vindicate a substantive right codified elsewhere, such as the right to a jury trial.
“Because the mandatory preference statute does not create a new right, but simply governs the implementation of existing rights, the Superior Court erred when it characterized it as substantive rather than procedural” in the Liger case, Hodge wrote.
Additionally, while the Revised Organic Act authorizes both the Legislature and the judicial branch to establish rules of procedure, the Senate infringes on the courts’ authority when it establishes procedures that conflict with those established by the judiciary, “or that otherwise impermissibly interfere with the internal operations of the court system or the authority of individual judicial officers to perform their official acts,” Hodge said in declaring the statute void and reversing Meade’s order for a speedy trial.
There will always be overlap in the division of powers, he said. For instance, “this Court has not only upheld, but repeatedly enforced via writ of mandamus, the statutory directive that the Superior Court rule on a habeas corpus petition ‘without delay,’” he wrote.
That’s in stark contrast to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals precedential opinion issued on Monday, which remanded Morton’s case back to the District Court with a sharp rebuke over the tardiness of the Virgin Islands’ court system in addressing his habeas corpus petition that raised 20 claims, including for violations of his Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy and his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
“In the normal course, federal courts do not entertain habeas petitions before a prisoner exhausts his state court remedies. But there comes a point when justice delayed becomes justice denied,” according to the Third Circuit opinion written by Judge Cheryl Ann Krause that details Morton’s herculean efforts to get his petition heard in both the Superior and District courts. Oral arguments were heard on Dec. 13 before Krause and Judges Thomas M. Hardiman and Marjorie O. Rendell.
“Morton has waited ten years for a court to reach the merits of his habeas petition. Such a delay erodes confidence in the judiciary and its ability to dispense justice, and it is unacceptable absent a compelling reason. We will therefore vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion,” Krause wrote.
The inordinate delay was severe, even considering the disruptions caused by the 2017 hurricanes and the COVID-19 pandemic, Krause said in her 14-page opinion.
“By the time Morton sought federal relief in April 2020, almost six years had elapsed since he first filed in territorial court, and the Superior Court had done nothing but hold a status conference three years earlier. As for progress in the territorial court, over four years have elapsed since Morton filed his federal petition, and seven since the Superior Court last acted, with no indication that proceedings will resume anytime soon. Taken together, these two factors — extreme delay and lack of progress — strongly support a determination of inordinate delay,” the judge wrote.
Morton satisfied his obligation to demonstrate inordinate delay, so the District Court should have required the Virgin Islands to justify his years-long wait, rather than dismissing it sua sponte, meaning of the judge’s own accord, without prompting, said Krause.
“We will vacate and remand to give the Government that opportunity,” she wrote.
